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Abstract: President Obama’s first trip to Africa as US President in July 2009 took him to Ghana. 
The president used his 2009 trip to articulate his broad and ambitious policy of engagement 
towards sub-Saharan Africa. His pronouncements during the trip to Ghana generated high 
expectations for a new dawn in the relationship between the United States and Africa.The U.S. 
President made Ghana his first stop on the continent because he was probably highly impressed 
by the institutionalization of democratic processes in the country. While in Ghana, the president 
highlighted that country's commitment to peaceful democratic transition and establishment of 
effective governance practices.  Obama also called on other African leaders to follow the example 
of Ghana by creating democratic institutions, embracing good governance practices, and showing 
respect for the human rights of their citizens. During his second trip to Africa from June 27-July 
2, 2013, President Obama and the First Lady traveled to Senegal, South Africa, and Tanzania to 
meet with leaders from government, business, and civil society, and to reinforce U.S. commitment 
to expanding economic growth, investment, and trade; strengthening democratic institutions; and 
investing in the next generation of African leaders. The U.S.-Africa Summit of August 6-7, 2014, 
convened by President Obama in Washington, D.C. was no doubt initiated to advance the political 
agenda of his previous two trips to Africa, and also to establish stronger economic and cultural 
ties with Africa. The 2014 summit brought together an unprecedented number of African leaders 
to Washington, D.C. for a two day conference that covered a broad array of topics ranging from 
health Care, trade and investments, security and terrorism, to good governance, democratic 
institutions and human rights. His third trip to Africa as President, took Obama to Kenya and 
Ethiopia from July 24-July 28, 2015.This visit was historic on two levels: it was the first time that 
a sitting American President had visited each of these countries as well address the African Union. 
In Kenya, Obama held bilateral meetings with Kenyan officials and attended the 2015 Global 
Economic/Entrepreneurship summit, an annual conference that brings together entrepreneurs, 
business leaders, and international organizations to discuss global economic and business issues. 
This trip built on the success of the August 2014 U.S.-Africa Leader’s Summit and continued 
America’s efforts to work with countries in sub-African, including Kenya, to accelerate economic 
growth, strengthen democratic institutions and improve health and security.  
A partnership between the United States and Africa is as important as it is strategic 
because both partners must work together in order to function effectively in a complex global 
environment that is increasingly plagued by terrorism, political instability, devastating public 
health epidemics, economic inequalities, poor governance and the failure to effect credible 
administrative reforms in a number of African nations. This paper proposes to examine the content 
of U.S. support for the establishment of democratic institutions and good governance practices in 
Africa since the onset of democratic transitions in Africa in the early 1990s. A review of American 
support for Africa’s democratic transitional process is important because the United States was 
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instrumental in supporting and facilitating the political discourse and initial processes that 
constituted the foundations of many transitional efforts in Africa. This task will be accomplished 
against the backdrop of the inability, unwillingness, or failure of some African nations to fully 
embrace the democratic processes and institutions upon which such US support is supposed to be 
predicated. It is apparent that the Anglophone nations in West, East and South Africa have been 
more responsive to the political practices advocated by the United States and its western allies 
and are in fact reforming their political institutions and administrative processes and procedures. 
By contrast, most Francophone nations in West and Central Africa are content with the status 
quo.  Why is there a discrepancy between the English-speaking and French-speaking African 
nations toward embracing democratic and good governance practices? It is to answering this 
question that this paper aspires to accomplish through a comparative analysis of the 
performance records of a select number of Anglophone and Francophone states in West and 
Central Africa.  How have these English (Ghana, Botswana, and South Africa) and French-
speaking (Cameroon, Ivory Coast, and the Democratic Republic of Congo) countries fared since 
President Obama first acknowledged the great strides made by Ghana during his 2009 visit? 
 
Keywords:  Administrative reforms, democracy, democratic practices, democratic transitions, 
human rights, good governance, Anglophone and Francophone Africa 
 
Introduction 
Over two decades ago, most countries in Sub-Saharan Africa embraced some form of transition 
to democratic governance. According to Ihonvbere and Mbaku (2003), the contestations that 
shaped these transitions in the early 1990s were informed and influenced by widespread agitations 
for human rights, social justice, multiparty politics, good governance, accountability, gender 
equality and respect for sociopolitical pluralism. During this third wave of democratization that 
swept across of Africa, the United States was instrumental in supporting and facilitating the 
political discourse and initial processes that constituted the foundations of many transitional efforts 
in Africa. Unfortunately, the euphoria and celebrations that accompanied this wave of democratic 
transitions in the region have all but evaporated. As a matter of fact, in some instances, that spirit 
of hope and optimism has been replaced by deep skepticism and frustration on the part of African 
scholars, civil society organizations, ordinary African citizens and the international community. 
Attempts to institutionalize democracy in the continent have failed to materialize largely because 
of the inability or unwillingness of some African leaders to foster the momentum of the 1990s by 
engaging in or committing to credible political reform agendas through the creation of democratic 
institutions and the embracement of good governance practices. To that end, some of the regimes 
that came to power with reformist agendas in 1990 “have become authoritarian, exploitative and 
as corrupt as their predecessors” (Ihonvbere and Mbaku, 2003, 8). By most accounts, there has 
been a diversity of outcomes with respect to the progress (or lack thereof) that has been made 
toward promoting and sustaining democracy in the region since the early 1990s.In many sub 
Saharan African nations, the single party state that existed prior to the advent of multiparty politics 
in the continent has been replaced by a variety of hybrid regimes that are incompatible with the 
ideal liberal democratic framework that was advocated and recommended by western nations, 
donor institutions and other external partners. By contrast, some other sub Saharan African nations, 
have made great strides toward adopting credible reformist democratic agendas characterized by 
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the establishment of democratic institutions and the implementation of good governance practices 
as discussed above. Clearly, a key problem that has impacted the effort to accurately the asses the 
progress or failure of democratic transitions across the continent since the 1990s has been the 
failure to accurately conceptualize or define democracy in a manner that is compatible with the 
goals, visions, values and political environments of the fifty four African nations. 
 
Conceptualizing and Defining Democracy in the context of African Politics 
While the desire to establish more democratic forms of government in Africa has become 
one of the most important issues on the political agendas of many African nations and external 
actors since the early 1990s, conceptualizing and defining democracy in a manner that is suitable 
for the continent continues to be problematic, if not elusive. Part of the problem with 
conceptualizing and defining democracy in a manner that is consistent with African values or 
beliefs is that the western or liberal democracy that the west felt would be the appropriate 
prescription for ending the increasing poverty, corruption and human rights abuses that Africans 
had suffered under authoritarian regimes since the 1960s has not been as successful as anticipated. 
As Brendalyn Ambrose (1995, 15) points out: 
Liberal democracy is a late product of market society because the first need of the market was for 
the liberal state, not the democratic one to be successful. The democratic dimension was only 
added when the working class that had been produced by the capitalist market society had been 
strong enough to get into competition, strong enough to demand that it should have some weight 
in the competitive process. 
In her view, liberal democracy resulted from capitalism and Africa does not have a history 
of capitalist development and evolution because the conditions that favored the growth of liberal 
democracy in the west do not exist in Africa. She maintains that what Africa needs is a type of 
democracy that will address Africa’s current social, cultural, political and economic realities 
(Ambrose 1995, 19). Generally, democracy is conceptualized as the process of transforming a 
group, community or state into a democratic entity. Consequently, when a society attempts to 
transition to democratic governance it embraces an arrangement that is shaped by a supreme power 
that is vested in the hands of the people through elected representatives, established laws that 
guarantee political equality, practice of the democratic spirit, empowerment of people to determine 
who governs and what policies and programs those who govern should pursue, established laws 
and mechanisms to ensure that those who govern are responsible, responsive and accountable to 
the people who bear the weight of their governance, opportunities for citizens to participate in the 
management of their affairs, respect and promotion of fundamental human rights, participation of 
citizens and their elected representatives in the crafting of laws to ensure justice in society and the 
prevalence of the rule of  law for all (Ambrose 1995, 19). 
The application of the concepts of liberal democracy (such as civil society, the state system, 
and the ideals of democracy which include, freedom, equality, justice and fraternity) in Africa as 
demanded and advocated by the west, in nearly three decades, has shown few positive signs of 
credible change. It is no wonder then that scholars in and out of Africa as well as other observers 
of the transitional process have argued that while democracy is an appropriate form of government 
worth adopting or experimenting with in Africa, to be successful, it must take a distinctively 
African character. They maintain that some elements of democracy (such as consultation, 
participation and consensus) have prevailed in many traditional African cultures for centuries. As 
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a result, it is worth noting here that in studying the transitions to democracy in Africa it is important 
to critically examine the generic or idealized view of established liberal democracies as a yardstick 
for normative comparison with the situation in Africa advanced by the democratization school. 
This approach compares African countries with a liberal democratic model by judging African 
political systems by how much they have deviated from or adhered to the ideal even though some 
mature democracies of the west have fallen short of the same standards. Given such comparative 
shortcomings, it is therefore imperative to conduct empirical research and comparative analysis so 
as to understand what is actually happening rather than what should happen or ought to happen 
(Mustapha and Whitfield 2009, 4).  
As Decker and Arrington (2015, ix), explain, any discourse in and out of Africa about 
improving the continent’s social, political and economic landscapes inevitably focuses on 
democratization. Discussions about politics, economic development, social welfare, human rights, 
environmental sustainability, natural resource exploitation and public health are often associated 
with the overarching concern with democracy in African countries. This discourse implies that 
with Democracy will come all the positive changes that many Africans desire. But if Democracy 
is the answer to so many of the major problems plaguing Africa, what has it not been more easily 
implemented? Decker and Arrington maintain further that observers in and out of Africa about the 
democratic process often speak as though there is a road map to the democratization process in 
Africa or that there is a framework or template for democracy in Africa. The reality, they stress, is 
that despite sustained pressure on African governments to democratize most states are not 
considered true democracies and not all believe that democracy is the solution to many of the 
challenges that they face in their daily lives and political systems. We are left wondering if 
democracy is truly possible or even desirable in Africa. Is it possible for us to conceive of good 
governance without attaching it to democracy? Is democracy a one size fits all endeavor or could 
there be Africanized democracies that reflect the unique political, economic and social cultures of 
each individual state? Is democracy antithetical to African beliefs and values? Are African leaders 
being misled by outsiders to believe that it is the only appropriate political system to implement? 
These are fundamental questions that should inform any discussion of the success or failure of 
democracy on the continent (Decker and Arrington 2015, ix). Admittedly, if the concept of 
democracy as discussed above is not a one size fits all process with a template that must be used 
in every environment where democratic transitions are being undertaken, then it must be seen as 
an evolving system that is not absolute and can be made adaptable to different environments based 
on the unique social, political, cultural and economic values of those environments. 
   In that context, how should democracy in Africa (or African democracy) be defined? 
Several scholars and African leaders have offered recommendations concerning the definition of 
democracy in a fashion that reflects Africa’s unique environment. Nwauwa Apollos (2005, 2) 
believes that the role of Africans in pushing for democratization based on their local conditions (a 
phenomenon which he refers to as “second independence”) should not be overlooked in any 
analysis. Broadly speaking, if a group of people have the ability to choose and replace their leaders 
through regular free and fair elections, they have an electoral democracy. This says nothing about 
the actual quality of the political system, however, because competition does not ensure enough 
high levels of freedom, quality, transparency, social justice or other liberal values. Electoral 
democracies make these values more achievable but they do not ensure them. A liberal democracy, 
on the other hand, is one that is governed by the rule of law and that protects property and civil 
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liberties. The state also provides equality under the law, due process, checks and balances, 
protection of minorities and freedom of expression. An open media and an active civil society are 
other important features. Some scholars suggest that the basic premises of liberalism, such as the 
importance of the individual are not necessarily relevant to African cultures. Instead alternative 
mechanisms of authority such as ethnicity, patronage and violence may be more important (Decker 
and Arrington 2015, x). It is therefore important to examine the ways in which Africans have 
constructed, are constructing and reshaping democracy to fit their own ideals and agendas. 
Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere described Democracy as follows: 
Democracy means that the people must be able to choose freely those who govern them 
and in broad terms determine what the government does in their name. It means that a 
government must be accountable to the people; it must be responsive to views expressed 
freely through a political machinery that the people can understand and use. They will only 
understand and use it if that machinery makes sense in terms of their own culture and is 
accessible with the framework of their own income and educational levels (Decker and 
Arrington 2015, x). 
 
Decker and Arrington note that Nyerere’s definition of Democracy has a decidedly liberal 
bent although it is important to remember that he ruled Tanzania for 21years as a semi autocratic 
one party state.  They argue that like most African leaders, his government fell somewhere along 
the autocracy-democracy spectrum or continuum. They maintain further that there are 
democratically elected governments that do not protect civil liberties, just as there are some 
autocratic governments that do (Decker and Arrington 2015, x).  Former Nigerian President 
Olusegun Obasanjo also offered his impressions about democracy in Africa. A central figure in 
the third wave of political decentralization in Africa, he led the Nigerian government for three 
years after the military ruler, General Murtala Mohammed, was assassinated in an abortive coup 
in 1976. Once civilian rule was re-established in 1979, Obasanjo stepped down from power. 
Though he was a military man, he was also a strong proponent of democratization.  
He argued that democracy was the best and most humane form of power but insisted that 
it must take a distinctly African form (Decker and Arrington 2015, 2-3) Decker. He maintained 
that the pursuit of justice was essential to the democratic process as were the following essential 
and vital ingredients: trust creation and confidence building between leaders and the populace, 
periodic elections of political leadership through the secret ballot, creation of an appropriate 
political machinery, promotion and defense of human rights, political communication, 
decentralization of political power and authority and education and political education (Decker 
and Arrington 2015, 3) 
Obasanjo firmly believed that political authority must be institutionalized instead of taking 
on a patrimonial character. He insisted that “those who govern must not behave as if authority or 
power is their personal property and something they can hand down to their heirs” Instead they 
should acknowledge that they are only representatives of the nation and not the owners of 
proprietors of sovereignty (Decker and Arrington 2015, 3). Democratization is a complex 
historical process by which a country moves away from authoritarian rule toward a political system 
that is more democratic and participatory. South African Political Scientist Shireen Hassim argues 
that: 
“any desirable form of democracy must encompass the civil and political rights advocated 
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by liberalism, the socio-economic freedoms at the heart of   socialism and the cultural 
freedoms envisaged by Feminism” (Decker and Arrington 2015, x). Democratization must 
enable the voices of the marginalized, particularly women to be heard in formal institutions 
of the state and ensure that representation leads to greater equality for the vast majority of 
citizens. It should also “encompass the movement toward the recognition of women’s 
sexual autonomy, bodily integrity and rights to cultural self-definition”. In other words 
democratization is about creating a space for the inclusion of larger numbers of votes and 
interests, both within and beyond the realm of formal politics (Decker and Arrington 2015, 
x). 
 
Despite the progress that has been made to embrace more transparent and accountable 
forms of governance in some Sub-Saharan African countries over more than two decades, political 
regression has indeed occurred in several countries in the region. In describing the progress or lack 
thereof of political democratization in Africa after more than two decades, Larry Diamond refers 
to a trend known as democratic progress and retreat (Decker and Arrington 2015, 4). On the one 
hand, there are more electoral democracies in Africa today than ever before. Between 1980 and 
2007, the number of democracies on the continent doubled while the number of authoritarian 
regimes decreased from approximately one half to one third. On the other hand, many of these 
democracies are poor in quality and can be easily reversed. On the other hand many of these 
democracies are poor in quality and can be easily reversed. For example, Diamond & Plattner 
(2010), argue that countries such as Cameroon that embraced the transition to a more accountable 
form of government have actually retreated to its authoritarian practices of yesteryears. Earl 
Conteh (1997, 15) echoes those sentiments by remarking that while the number of democratic 
states in Africa has increased since the 1990s such growth has been characterized by an irregular 
two steps forward and one step backwards approach In January 2012, a massive insurgency tore 
through Northern Mali fueled by the influx of heavy weapons from Libya’s 2011 civil war. When 
government forces could not contain the rebellion, a faction of the military staged a coup d’état 
and overthrew the democratically elected president from power. Islamists used this as an excuse 
to seize control of the North from the rebels and implemented Islamic law (sharia law). The crisis 
came to an end in January 2013 when French forces intervened and recaptured the embattled 
northern region. Six months’ later elections were held and some semblance of democracy was 
restored to Mali. Significant democratic backsliding has also occurred in Togo, Gabon, Guinea 
and Uganda with the repeal of constitutional term limits (Decker and Arrington 2015, 4). Other 
problems include a lack of adherence to the rule of law, infringements on freedoms of expression 
and association, widespread corruption and discrimination against women and members of the 
lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and queer communities. Freedom House, a nongovernmental 
organization that conducts research and advocacy on issues related to Democracy, political 
freedom and human rights conducts an annual survey that evaluates the state of global freedom as 
experienced by individuals. Freedom is measured according to the enjoyment of political rights 
and civil liberties. A country that is labeled free is one where there is open political competition, a 
climate of respect for civil liberties, significant independent civic life and an autonomous media. 
One that is partly free has limited respect for political rights and civil liberties. Finally, in a country 
that is not free basic political rights are absent and civil liberties are widely and systematically 
denied. According to the most recent Freedom in the World Report, 22% of countries in Sub-
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Saharan Africa were free, 37% were partly free and 41% were not free (Decker and Arrington 
2015, 5). When broken down by population, 13% of the population in Sub-Saharan Africa was 
free, 51% was partly free and 36% was not free. Ghana was the country with the highest rating 
meaning that its citizens enjoyed the most political rights and civil liberties while Sudan, Somalia 
and Eritrea had the lowest ratings (Decker and Arrington 2015, 4-5). 
  While there are many reasons to explain the lack of progress, one of the most important is 
the fact that the institutional arrangements inherited by the new democrats were not capable of 
effectively handling the demands of the people for increased participation in both political and 
economic markets. In fact, many of these new leaders attempted to use the same undemocratic, 
exploitative, antiquated, violent and insensitive political structures and methods to govern in the 
new era. Especially of the note is the fact that the new democrats were attempting to use these 
anachronistic structures to deal with ethnic conflict and poverty, two of the issues that had not been 
dealt with effectively by the ancient regime that had contributed to the collapse of authoritarianism 
in the continent. The result has been the failure of the new post-cold war governments in Africa to 
reduce destructive ethnic conflict, deal more effectively with poverty especially among women, 
children and rural inhabitants and provide the enabling institutional environment for wealth 
creation. These so called new democrats have also failed to institutionalize democratic governance 
in their respective countries and make national political and economic systems more inclusive- 
most institutions are still dominated and women remain on the political and economic periphery 
where they have been for the last 50 years. Throughout the continent, these new democrats are 
unable and unwilling to cope and deal democratically with even modest opposition groups and 
several organizations especially women organizations that are emerging to represent and speak for 
hitherto marginalized and excluded constituencies (Ihonvbere and Mbaku 2003, 41). Most of the 
post 1990s leaders inherited economies that had been bankrupted by many years of plundering and 
neglect. Poor management and high levels of political and economic instability had forced most 
of the skilled labor resources to migrate to more stable and lucrative economies. Significant 
amounts of capital had fled to the West and perverse economic policies promoted by opportunistic 
politicians and civil servants had closed destroyed most opportunities for domestic wealth creation. 
Thus, in the early 1990s, the new democrats inherited nonviable, bankrupt and highly unproductive 
economies, most of which were incapable of meeting even the basic needs of their populations. As 
these new democrats took office, they were faced with enormous problems which even the most 
skilled and competent politicians could not easily resolve. From Mandel and Mbeki in South Africa 
to Obasanjo in Nigeria, these new leaders faced enormous challenges, as the people, were 
demanding quick and immediate changes to the problems plaguing their societies such as poverty, 
inequity and inequality in the distribution of resources, lack of access to health care especially in 
the rural areas, rising and often out of control HIV/AIDS infection rates and the continued 
marginalization of certain groups such as women, children, rural inhabitants, ethnic minorities and 
those forced by circumstance to live on the urban periphery (Ihonvbere and Mbaku 2003, 41).  
  However, in order to examine the extent to which African nations have made progress 
towards transitions to more democratic systems of governance or have failed to do so, I would be 
using core elements of liberal democracy to assess the different orientations of Anglophone and 
Francophone African nations to democratic practices. My reason for using these elements is that 
the form of democracy that African nations were encouraged to develop in the 1990s was shaped 
and influenced by those elements. These elements or governance indicators include: responsive or 
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participatory democracy, respect for human rights and freedoms, adherence to the rule of law, the 
existence of an independent judiciary, vibrant or robust civil society, a viable and effective 
opposition and a free and independent media. 
 
Factors that Fueled the transition to Multi-Party Politics in Sub-Saharan Africa  
             As Abdul Mustapha and Lindsay Whitfield maintain (2009, 1), it was a combination of 
internal and external factors that created effective pressure for political transition in Africa. The 
first external factor that provided an impetus for political transition in Africa had to do with the 
end of the cold war. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the subsequent end of 
superpower rivalry, Africa lost its strategic importance to the former cold war protagonists. 
Consequently, many of the continent’s dictatorships which had been supported by the United 
States and its western allies and by the Soviet Union and its satellite states lost their financial and 
military assistance. In the absence of the significant development aid and budget subventions that 
had supported them many of these authoritarian regimes soon collapsed (Ihonvbere and Mbaku, 
2003, 28). 
In the mid1980s rising debt levels became an important constraint to economic growth and 
development in Africa. To assist African nations to manage their external debt more effectively 
and plan for economic growth and development the IMF and World Bank became actively 
involved in conditional lending to the continent. However, in the 1990s, As John Wiseman (1995, 
3) maintains, the Bretton Woods institutions added political conditionality to the list of 
requirements to be met by African nations. As a result, to qualify for additional loans from either 
the IMF, World Bank or developed nations, African Sates had to be willing to implement a variety 
of policy reforms including reductions in the sizes of their government sectors, devaluation of their 
currencies, deregulation of their international trade sectors and greater reliance on markets for the 
allocation of resources. Ultimately, the World Bank required that potential borrowers engage in 
reforms to improve the efficiencies of their economic and political systems as a condition for 
additional credits from the international financial community. As a result of these developments 
the World Bank and IMF became important external stimuli to the reform and prodemocracy 
movement in Africa (Ihonvbere and Mbaku 2003, 28). 
Following the end of the Cold war, United States foreign policy was revised in favor of 
countries around the world that were making an effort to establish transparent, participatory, and 
accountable governance structures and market based economic systems. As a result of   America’s 
new foreign aid approach, countries that were embracing democratic transitions and opening up 
national resources to more citizens than before benefited from American foreign aid 
disbursements. The change in policy forced many countries in Africa to work toward the 
democratization of their political systems in order to remain eligible for U.S. aid (Ihonvbere and 
Mbaku 2003, 29). In the late 80s and early 90s many developed nations established new aid 
regimes which required that development be disbursed on the condition that recipient nations 
demonstrate the extent to which they had established transparent and participatory governance 
structures. Political conditionality was soon formally adopted by the European Union and the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) as part of their foreign aid 
policy. They were determined to use their development aid programs to push for democracy, free 
markets and good governance in developing nations (Ihonvbere and Mbaku 2003, 29). In essence, 
the international community saw the wave of democratizations as opportunities to usher in political 
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and economic liberalization in Africa as well as integrate the continent into the neoliberal global 
economic system. The international context was thus responsible for the incessant calls for 
political liberalization and multi-party elections across the continent (Mustapha and Whitfield 
2009, 2). 
Internal factors also contributed to the transition to democratic governance in the continent. 
By most accounts, the February 1990 National Conference in Benin ushered in an era of political 
liberalization in Sub Saharan Africa that culminated in the introduction of multiparty elections in 
most African countries in the 1990s.  As Ihonvbere and Mbaku (2003, 32), observes, Benin’s 
Conference Nationale was considered significant in Africa’s political transition because it was the 
first such effort in the continent and the one that set the standards for the others. Unable to support 
a corrupt political leadership structure that was sustained by laws and institutions from the 
independence era that fostered the exploitation of the masses, abuse of their basic rights and 
freedoms and the existence of a dismal economy, the citizens of Benin forced President Kerekou 
to submit to the establishment of a national conference as well as accept the peoples’ demand for 
institutional reforms. Unlike previous reform efforts which had been dominated by the urban elite 
in Benin, membership in the national council, whose responsibility was to craft a new constitution 
for Benin, reflected the nation’s diverse ethnic and social cleavages (Ihonvbere and Mbaku 2003, 
32). 
Benin’s national conference had a significant impact on political transition in Africa 
because it paved the way for others to follow. As it was the case in Benin, national conferences 
across Africa generally developed the modalities for transition to democracy and immediate 
national elections to pick a government responsible for leading the country to democracy. In the 
1990s, Africa witnessed the birth of national councils or sovereign conferences in countries such 
as Mali, South Africa, Congo (Brazzaville), Zaire, Niger and Togo. Most of these conferences 
were driven by agendas that included:  determining its mandate, selecting those to participate and 
defining its agenda. The vast majority of these conferences were characterized by large 
representation which included individuals from a variety of civic organizations and political 
parties. As Mustapha & Whitfield (2009, 1), note, the movements for political change across the 
continent consisted largely of civil society organizations, marginalized politicians who had lost the 
favor of their respective governments, ethnic minorities that felt discriminated against, workers 
and trade unions, students, women’s organizations, religious organizations and human rights 
activists. Their  calls for institutionalized and competitive elections, respect for civil and political 
liberties and a departure from authoritarian rule were shaped and influenced by five decades of 
discontent under exploitative and opportunistic regimes whose efforts were focused on economic 
plunder, suffocation of civil society, denigration of popular forces, destruction of the environment, 
oppression of women, abuse of human rights and impoverishment of minority and vulnerable 
groups including many ethnic nationalities and women, poor governance, lack of accountability, 
gender inequality, no social justice and disrespect for sociopolitical pluralism. (Ihonvbere and 
Mbaku 2003, 4-7). 
  As previously mentioned, groups that were historically marginalized and disenfranchised 
intensified calls for good governance, freedom, economic wellbeing that had been repressed by 
authoritarian postcolonial regimes. Domestic groups in various Sub Saharan African countries 
envisaged the transition to democracy as an opportunity to gain greater political inclusion, 
accelerate the demilitarization of politics, enjoy greater economic and social amenities and witness 
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the loosening of presidential authoritarianism (Mustapha and Whitney 2009, 1). Internal struggles 
for democratic governance systems date back to the struggle for independence. In the early 1960s, 
Africans fought to end colonial dictatorships in order to establish laws and institutions that fostered 
peaceful coexistence and sustainable development (Ihonvbere and Mbaku 2003, 29). 
Unfortunately, the new countries, adopted constitutions that allowed a few individuals to 
completely dominate and monopolize post-independence political economies. As a result, the 
majority of Africans continued to be denied access to political and economic markets. The 
demonstrations that erupted across most of Sub Saharan Africa in the late 1980s were a 
continuation of the struggles for more effective governance systems that prevailed during 
colonialism and hastened its end.  During the 1960s, Africans protested against colonial 
oppression, corruption, excessive intervention in the economy and the lack of access to political 
and economic opportunities. These protests that were largely characterized by strikes, 
demonstrations, marches and boycotts, were generally designed to force the state to repeal certain 
laws and statutes that were usually deemed to be unfair, distribute free and public goods more 
equitably, force civil servants to become more efficient, reduce overcrowding at local universities 
and hospitals and improve working conditions for public servants. Essentially such protests were 
aimed at benefiting some group in society. The protests of the late 1980s, however, were geared 
towards comprehensive institutional reforms involving reconstructing the post-colonial state to 
provide countries with more effective governance structures and sustainable economic 
infrastructures. While the protests of the late 1980s often began with demands by interest groups 
seeking to maximize some narrowly defined objective, they soon evolved into a struggle for state 
reconstruction (Ihonvbere and Mbaku 2003, 31). Because regime legitimacy in Africa is driven by 
popular evaluations of government performance, support for democratic transitions was going to 
be based on whether newly established democratic governments deserved legitimization because 
they will be more effective than their predecessors (Moseley 2007, 318). 
 
Assessing the success and Failures of transitions to Democratic Rule in Africa since the 1990s 
  Most experts on democratic transitions around the world have observed that after more 
than two decades of attempts at transitions to more transparent and accountable governance 
systems across Sub-Saharan Africa, the political landscape has changed in some instances but not 
as dramatically as it was anticipated in other instances.  As Mustapha and Whitfield (2009, 2) 
argue, it is important to assess the extent to which domestic and international expectations of 
African democratization have or have not been met. It is also important to examine major trends 
and patterns in the politics of African states during the era of democratization and then assess what 
these trends and patterns mean for the process of democratization. In terms of trends one cannot 
help but admit that democratization led to some “tectonic movements” in African Politics. One 
indicator is the way African leaders get into power and leave office. The number of African leaders 
leaving power through coups especially after 2000 has decreased while the number leaving power 
voluntarily or through electoral defeats has increased since 1990. The process of ascending to 
power through constitutional changes in Sub Saharan Africa is beginning to be affected by 
constitutional changes which stipulate presidential term limits and by the proliferation of elections 
(Mustapha and Whitfield 2009, 2). Political rights and civil liberties have improved in several 
countries and worsened in others. On the other hand, the era of democratization has also been 
characterized by continuities with past political practices. In many countries, democratization has 
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been halting, incomplete and frequently reversible. In countries such as Cote D’Ivoire, Cameroon 
and Zimbabwe, things seemed to have worsened in the era of democratization as stable semi-
authoritarian regimes have become less stable and more authoritarian. The inconsistent nature of 
the democratic process has bred disappointment leading Richard Joseph (1998) to use the term 
“virtual democracies to describe the strange admixture of democratic forms and illiberal practices 
that still characterize many democratic nations in Africa. To that end, the euphoria of the early 
1990s has been replaced, since the late 1990s, by a pessimistic outlook (Mustapha and Whitfield 
2009, 3). 
Recent research echoes the sentiments of Richard Joseph, Abdul Mustapha and Lindsay 
Whitfield. Few countries in Africa have succeeded at consolidating democracy and the process 
remains fragile in many countries. Ihonvbere and Mbaku (2003, 39), argue that the euphoria that 
characterized the late 1980s and early 1990s prodemocracy grassroots organizations has dissipated 
or has been significantly tempered. Today only a few of the scholars and analysts who were 
optimistic about the continents prospects for transitions to democratic governance in the 1990s 
remain. In many countries in Africa, the possibility of returning to authoritarian governance remain 
quite high. For example, the relatively significant gains made in democratizing Cameroon’s 
politics since 1990, when political competition was legalized, have since been lost as the 
incumbent government has resorted to its pre-1990 repressive tactics and opportunistic leadership. 
In Zambia Frederick Chiluba failed to keep the promises he made to transform critical domains 
and institutionalize democratic rule in Zambia. Instead he adopted the same repressive and 
exploitative tactics that kept Kenneth Kaunda in office for most of the country’s post-independence 
period (Ihonvbere and Mbaku 2003, 40). As determined by Kieh (1999, 110), over half of Africa’s 
53 states were still under some form of authoritarian rule. In Togo, Gabon, Democratic Republic 
of Congo and Kenya, the sons of former authoritarian leaders took over power in the early years 
of the new century.  
Clearly, the assessments of Africa’s progress towards democratic governance since the 
1990s discussed above indicate that only few countries in Africa have been able to consolidate 
democracy. Herbst (2000) uses peaceful transfer of power through elections as an indicator of the 
deepening of democracy and identifies Benin, Mauritius and Madagascar as multiparty 
democracies. However, he notes that in Benin and Madagascar, the democrats who led these 
country’s democratization efforts were replaced through elections by autocrats. In Benin, former 
dictator Mathew Kerekou replaced Nicephore Soglo and in Madagascar, Albert Zafy’s position 
was captured by Didier Ratsiraka. Many of these old guard politicians now pose important 
obstacles to their respective countries transitions to democratic governance programs. Even though 
they were returned to power through the democratic process, they have become less and less 
democratic as they attempt to destroy the opposition and prolong their tenure in office. In 10 or so 
countries elections have brought only a single transfer of power. These include Cape Verde, the 
Central African Republic, Liberia, Malawi, Mali, Nigeria, Sao Tome, Sierra Leone, South Africa 
and Zambia. In most countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, there have been either no elections at all or 
elections without any transfer of power such as in Cameroon. Ghana and Senegal, it must be not 
be noted, had nationwide elections in 2001with successful and peaceful changes. Uganda 
successfully completed elections in 2001 but there was no change in regime and South Africa 
undertook its second democratic transition in 1999 with Thabo Mbeki replacing Nelson Mandela 
as head of state. Continuing with this tradition of genuine change in South Africa, Jacob Zuma 
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replaced Thabo Mbeki in 2009 as head of State of South Africa. There was also a successful 
transition and regime change in Kenya in 2002. The ruling African National Union(KANU) was 
defeated at the polls by a broad coalition of opposition political parties called the Rainbow 
Coalition under the leadership of Mwai Kibaki. Uhuru Kenyatta replaced Kibaki in 2013 in a 
successful transition that was accompanied by regime change (Ihonvbere and Mbaku 2003, 40). 
Despite the progress that has been made to embrace more transparent and accountable 
forms of governance in some Sub-Saharan African countries over more than two decades, political 
regression has indeed occurred in several countries in the region. In describing the progress or lack 
thereof of political democratization in Africa after more than two decades, Larry Diamond refers 
to a trend known as democratic progress and retreat (Decker and Arrington 2015, 4). On the one 
hand, there are more electoral democracies in Africa today than ever before. Between 1980 and 
2007, the number of democracies on the continent doubled while the number of authoritarian 
regimes decreased from approximately one half to one third. On the other hand, many of these 
democracies are poor in quality and can be easily reversed. In January 2012, a massive insurgency 
tore through Northern Mali fueled by the influx of heavy weapons from Libya’s 2011 civil war. 
When government forces could not contain the rebellion, a faction of the military staged a coup 
d’état and overthrew the democratically elected president from power. Islamists used this as an 
excuse to seize control of the North from the rebels and implemented Islamic law (sharia law). The 
crisis ended in January 2013 when French forces intervened and recaptured the embattled northern 
region. Six months’ later elections were held and some semblance of democracy was restored to 
Mali. However, Mali’s future continues to be unstable as various factions, including the threat 
from Islamic militants, continue to seek for power in Mali. Significant democratic backsliding has 
also occurred in Togo, Gabon, Guinea and Uganda with the repeal of constitutional term limits 
(Decker and Arrington 2015, 4). Other problems include a lack of adherence to the rule of law, 
infringements on freedoms of expression and association, widespread corruption and 
discrimination against women and members of the lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and queer 
communities. Freedom House, a nongovernmental organization that conducts research and 
advocacy on issues related to Democracy, political freedom and human rights conducts an annual 
survey that evaluates the state of global freedom as experienced by individuals. Freedom is 
measured according to the enjoyment of political rights and civil liberties. A country that is labeled 
free is one where there is open political competition, a climate of respect for civil liberties, 
significant independent civic life and an autonomous media. One that is partly free has limited 
respect for political rights and civil liberties. Finally, in a country that is not free basic political 
rights are absent and civil liberties are widely and systematically denied. According to the most 
recent Freedom in the World Report, 22% of countries in Sub-Saharan Africa were free, 37% were 
partly free and 41% were not free (Decker and Arrington 2015, 5). When broken down by 
population, 13% of the population in Sub-Saharan Africa was free, 51% was partly free and 36% 
was not free. Ghana was the country with the highest rating meaning that its citizens enjoyed the 
most political rights and civil liberties while Sudan, Somalia and Eritrea had the lowest ratings 
(Decker and Arrington 2015, 4-5).  
 While the lack of progress towards credible transitions to democratic rule in Africa can be 
attributed to several factors one of the most important reasons is the fact that the institutional 
arrangements inherited by the new democrats were not capable of effectively handling the 
demands of the people for increased participation in both political and economic markets. In fact, 
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many of these new leaders attempted to use the same undemocratic, exploitative, antiquated, 
violent and insensitive political structures and methods to govern in the new era. Of special note 
is the fact that the new democrats were attempting to use these anachronistic structures to deal 
with ethnic conflict and poverty, two of the issues that had not been dealt with effectively by the 
ancient regimes thus leading to the collapse of authoritarianism in the continent. The result has 
been the failure of the new post-cold war governments in Africa to reduce destructive ethnic 
conflict, deal more effectively with poverty especially among women, children and rural 
inhabitants and provide the enabling institutional environment for wealth creation. These so called 
new democrats have also failed to institutionalize democratic governance in their respective 
countries and make national political and economic systems more inclusive. Most institutions are 
still dominated and women remain on the political and economic periphery where they have been 
for the last 50 years. Throughout the continent, these new democrats are unable and unwilling to 
cope and deal democratically with even modest opposition groups and several organizations 
especially women organizations that are emerging to represent and speak for hitherto marginalized 
and excluded constituencies (Ihonvbere and Mbaku 2003, 41). Most of the post 1990s leaders 
inherited economies that had been bankrupted by many years of plundering and neglect. Poor 
management and high levels of political and economic instability had forced most of the skilled 
labor resources to migrate to more stable and lucrative economies. Significant amounts of capital 
had fled to the West and perverse economic policies promoted by opportunistic politicians and 
civil servants had closed destroyed most opportunities for domestic wealth creation. Thus, in the 
early 1990s, the new democrats inherited nonviable, bankrupt and highly unproductive economies, 
most of which were incapable of meeting even the basic needs of their populations. As these new 
democrats took office, they were faced with enormous problems which even the most skilled and 
competent politicians could not easily resolve. From Mandel and Mbeki in South Africa to 
Obasanjo in Nigeria, these new leaders faced enormous challenges, as the people, were demanding 
quick and immediate changes to the problems plaguing their societies such as poverty, inequity 
and inequality in the distribution of resources, lack of access to health care especially in the rural 
areas, rising and often out of control HIV/AIDS infection rates and the continued marginalization 
of certain groups such as women, children, rural inhabitants, ethnic minorities and those forced by 
circumstance to live on the urban periphery (Ihonvbere and Mbaku 2003, 41).  
 
 
Discrepant Orientations Towards Democratic Rule in Africa since the 1990s 
A cursory review of the successes and challenges of democratic transitions in Africa 
provided above indicates that the greatest challenges or failures to embrace more democratic or 
transparent systems of governance in Africa since the 1990s have occurred in francophone African 
nations. While this section focuses on the discrepant orientations towards democratic rule in 
Cameroon, Ivory Coast and the Democratic Republic of Congo, it is worth noting here that with 
the exception of Senegal, the remaining francophone nations across the continent have not fared 
well in terms of the progress that they have made to adopt more transparent and accountable forms 
of government. In chad, Niger, Mali, Burkina Faso, Guinea, Togo, Benin, Central African 
Republic, Gabon, Congo Brazzaville, Rwanda, the previous autocratic forms of governance that 
existed in these countries prior to the 1990s have been retained in one form or another and the 
cosmetic or rhetorical changes that have been made have failed to register credible transitions to 
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democratic rule. Widely seen as examples of dissolving states in the continent of Africa, the 
francophone nations of Cameroon, Ivory Coast and the Democratic Republic of Congo where the 
transition to democratic rule in the 1990s began with some optimism stalled and then regressed. 
Essentially, these are states where the integration of the various ethnic segments of these states has 
failed and there has been a breakdown in law and order. The second half of this section will also 
focus on orientations towards democratic rule of the Anglophone African nations of Ghana, 
Botswana, and South Africa where credible progress towards transitions to more open and 
transparent forms of government have been registered since the 1990s. 
 
Cameroon, Ivory Coast and the Democratic Republic of Congo 
The political gains that were made in Cameroon following the onset of multi-party politics 
in Cameroon in the 1990s have all but dissipated. As a result of internal and external pressures for 
change, to which the Biya regime was subjected in the 1990s, the creation of parties, supposedly 
to compete in free and open elections, was authorized. Some degree of press freedom was allowed 
and a draft constitution that was supposed to establish freedoms, rights and political institutions 
was crafted but was not ratified. Despite the fact that the government created the appearance that 
it was truly committed to embracing transparent forms of democratic governance, it did not quite 
give up its authoritarian modes of operation. The Presidential elections of 1992 that the opposition 
Social Democratic Front won were accorded to Paul Biya. Since 1992, the Biya regime has coopted 
numerous opposition parties, amended the constitution to enable him to rule for life and has turned 
to the repressive methods of yesteryears. Public participation in the political process has been 
nonexistent because Cameroonians have become apathetic to any notion of change under the 
current regime. They have simply given up relying instead on some chance that divine intervention 
would rescue them from the political, economic and social bondage in which they find themselves. 
Paul Biya’s sixth straight presidential victory in Cameroon in October 2011—extending his 29-
year rule by another seven years—may not be an indication that all is well in the republic, and that 
there is no will for change. Low voter turnout and opposition accusations of electoral fraud indicate 
that people in Cameroon have become apathetic. As Ihonvbere & Mbaku (2003, 39-40) argue, 
(with respect to the fact that in several countries throughout the continent, the possibility of return 
to authoritarianism remains quite high) the relatively significant gains made in democratizing 
Cameroon politics since 1990, when political competition was legalized, have since been lost as 
the incumbent government has reverted to its pre-1990 repressive tactics and opportunistic 
leadership. Takougang and Krieger (1998) observed that if by 2010 meaningful political change 
had not occurred in Cameroon the nation might descend into chaos. Because those anticipated 
reforms did not occur, Peter Vakunta (2012) also argued that Cameroon was a nation tethering on 
the brink of collapse. More and more, Cameroonians are turning their hopes toward the diaspora 
to bring an end to three decades of stagnation, marginalization of minority groups, corruption, 
abuse of human rights, denial of press freedoms, mismanagement of public resources and 
repression under Biya. Transition to democratic or more open forms of governance in Cameroon 
have failed because of:  a weak or coopted opposition movement, weak institutions to consolidate 
democracy, lack of opportunity for public or civil society participation in the democratic process, 
consistent support for the incumbent regime by France,  the absence of external pressure from 
multilateral or bilateral organizations and the fact that the democratic process has not been 
grounded in African values and consequently has not been fully understood by grassroots and civil 
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society organizations which should provide the impetus for any successful transition. 
 
Ivory Coast 
 The social, economic and political development of Ivory Coast was inspired by Houphouet 
Boigny who ruled the nation from 1960-1990. Regarded, along with Senegal, as models of post-
colonial development in Africa by France, the two countries pursued different paths towards 
democratization. While Senegal was praised for its tolerant and liberal political orientation, Cote 
d’Ivoire was regarded as a haven of stability and an African economic miracle until the 1990s.  
Consequently, democratization became the trigger that called into question the sustainability of 
the social, political and economic network that Boigny had constructed for over 30 years. Given 
the violent protests for political freedoms and transparent forms of governance that engulfed Ivory 
Coast in the 1990s a review of the system that had been dominated by one individual for so long 
was inevitable. Boigny’s idea of the Ivorian nation was the result of politico-economic 
compromises devised by him that were shaped by three inextricably linked principles: (a) a 
centralized open door economic policy, (b) an indigenous bourgeoisie dependent on the state and 
(c) the paternalistic management of ethnic diversity (Mustapha and Whitfield 2009, 32). 
Houphouet Boigny inherited the colonial politics of controlling Ivoirian territory and transformed 
these principles into a national policy of development. The inheritance included primarily the 
production of agricultural commodities (cocoa, coffee, cotton, rubber) and a steady supply of 
manual labor from Upper Volta or Burkina Faso. The institution of an attractive investment code 
after independence facilitated the mobilization of foreign capital and expertise. In addition to this 
economic structure was the use of a state controlled patronage system to create an elite loyal to the 
person of Houphouet Boigny. The goal was to build a national bourgeoisie capable of acting as a 
class of local investors and entrepreneurs in an economy, dominated by foreign, largely French 
capital, often through the licit and illicit use of state resources. (Mustapha and Whitfield 2009, 32). 
The dominant elite belonged to a single party, the PDCI (Democratic Party of Cote d’Ivoire) and 
were distinguished by their wealth and ostentatious consumption made possible by political 
protection. 
 Boigny’s politico-economic system was based on the particular management of ethnic 
diversity. To guarantee longevity in power, Boigny developed an ideology based on the myth of 
the legitimacy of members of the Akan group to govern others. To support this myth this ideology 
had to double as a way of managing the mosaic of more than 60 ethnicities regrouped into four 
linguistic families- the Mande, the Gur, the kru and the kwa or Akan. The Houphouet ideology of 
the natural propensity of the Baoule (subgroup of the Akan) to rule over others was without any 
justification and was used to disqualify other ethnicities from political power. This ideology was 
fiercely contested by the other groups who patiently waited for an opportunity to prove that it was 
wrong and democratization provided such an occasion. The economic crisis of the 1980s, an 
increasingly volatile population of young people who were educated but were unemployed, the 
physical exhaustion of the ageing Houphouet Boigny, pressure from Bretton Woods institutions 
and Paris for Boigny to accept structural adjustment reforms and democratize, fueled the politics 
of protest and violence that engulfed Ivory Coast in the early 1990s. Unlike the gradualist 
democratization that took place in Senegal, democratization in Cote d’Ivoire was a result of the 
combined effects of internal crises and external pressures. After Houphouet Boigny’s death in 
December 1992, three Presidents succeeded him (Henri Konan Bedie (1993-99), General Robert 
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Guei (1999-2000) and Laurent Gagbo (2000-2011). Under these three governments the 
relationship between the state and Ivoirian society continued to deteriorate with violence as the 
dominant mode of political articulation (Mustapha and Whitfield 2009, 38). The country would 
soon evolve from one dominated by political violence to one shaped by civil war. 
 Neither the election of Gagbo in 2000 nor his assumption of office resulted in the 
establishment of a more orderly form of government. Indeed, Cote D’Ivoire lurched from political 
violence and social conflict to civil war, further dramatizing the unstable nature of its democratic 
process. Conflict resolution, peacebuilding and reconciliation have replaced democratization as 
the principal objectives of public policy in a country once regarded as very stable. Mustapha & 
Whitfield (2009, 42) argue that the reasons for the civil war are attributable to the unjustified policy 
of Ivoirite or people from the north and its physical manifestation, the identity card that became 
an ubiquitous symbol of citizenship in Francophone Africa. They further maintain that Gbagbo 
became President in a political climate of general suspicion and rumors of conspiracies and coups 
were common during his first two years. Each of at least twenty alleged attempts to overthrow the 
newly elected government was met with arrest, torture, mutilation and death.  In their view, 
violence continued to be the preferred instrument of politics revealing an almost romantic use of 
force by successive governments in the face of equally violent incivilities from opponents. The 
forum of National Reconciliation organized by the government in 2001 to ease social and political 
tensions and ensure that reconciliation, consultation and respect for pluralism replaced violence as 
the principal mechanism for political articulation failed to materialize. President Gbagbo refused 
to accept the forum’s conclusions which included full acknowledgement of the full citizenship of 
Quattara who had become a symbol of northern and mixed ethnicities sense of exclusion from full 
citizenship and the political system. The unresolved tensions soon degenerated into civil war and 
the partitioning of the country. Several actors got involved in searching for a solution including 
France which wanted to protect a large French population in Ivorian soil. However, when asked to 
defeat the rebels, France refused to implement the bilateral military agreements with Cote Ivoire 
arguing that the problem was purely an Ivorian matter that involved no external threat (Mustapha 
and Whitfield 2009, 43). After several unsuccessful attempts by numerous actors including 
ECOWAS, the UN and France to mediate peace, Laurent Gbagbo and opposition leader Soro 
Kigbafori reached an accord with the help of President Blaise Campaore who had longed been 
blamed for the rebellion. The Ouagadougou Political Agreement of March 4, 2007 was designed 
to end the crisis ensure the departure of foreign troops as well as the implementation of the 
following major actions (Mustapha and Whitfield 2009, 46). Gagbo would eventually be removed 
from power and jailed and Alassane Quattara would assume leadership in an unstable and deeply 
divided Ivory Coast.  
 
The Democratic Republic of Congo  
Ihonvbere &  Mbaku (2003, 217) maintain that the need for political reform in the 
Democratic Republic of  Congo(DRC) and the rest of Africa was underscored by three factors:  
the collapse of the Soviet Union and the cessation of the cold war which sharply diminished the 
strategic and economic importance of the DRC and the rest of the continent in western 
policymaking circles, the lack of interest by the United States and its western allies to continue to 
support the Mobutu regime and other client regimes in Africa and pressure from western 
governments and multilateral agencies, especially the IMF and World Bank that aid flows into 
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Africa be contingent upon on improvements in domestic governance systems and macroeconomic 
performance and intolerable economic hardship which derived partly from corruption, 
mismanagement and dwindling export earnings that added fuel to long standing domestic pressure 
for Democracy and accountability in Congo and other African countries. 
Against the backdrop of pressure at home and abroad, Mobutu established the groundwork 
for political reforms at home when he abolished the single party state and lifted the ban on 
competitive politics on April 24, 1990. While Mobutu’s actions signaled the beginning of 
multiparty politics in the DRC, he also surreptitiously launched a campaign that was designed to 
derail the efforts of popular constituencies that were now fully engaged in reforms to institute 
democratic governance in the country. The main thrust of Mobutu’s strategy consisted of 
monopolizing institutions such as the central bank, the treasury, state owned radio and television, 
the police and military. Centralized control of these institutions provided the government with the 
resources to co-opt, intimidate, torture and silence rival politicians and popular constituencies. In 
addition, Mobutu and his cronies resuscitated the defunct Popular Movement for the Revolution 
(MPR), and its name was later changed to the Popular Movement for Renewal. The movement 
was instrumental in sponsoring the creation of shadow opposition groups which could be used to 
contest elections thus giving outside observers the impression that the DRC now had a fully 
functioning competitive political system. Finally, Mobutu’s strategy for undermining the transition 
to Democracy in Congo included attempts to instigate ethno-political rivalries among the 
opposition groups (Ihonvbere and Mbaku 2003, 218). 
Clearly, the formation of the Sacred Union, or coalition of several opposition and 
prodemocracy political parties in 1991 represented a new development in Congolese politics as it 
demonstrated the people’s determination to transcend traditional political divisions in order to 
concentrate on what was supposed to be the final round of a protracted struggle to rid the country 
of internal colonialism. The formation of the prodemocracy coalition further signaled the desire of 
Mobutu’s political opponents to forge a common front for the purpose of securing international 
recognition and support for their cause. Like similar coalitions established in Africa in the 1990s, 
the Sacred Union reiterated post- cold war declarations on democracy and human rights by western 
governments. Accordingly, its leaders embarked on a public relations campaign and issued clarion 
calls on the international community to assist their effort to dismantle the Mobutu dictatorship. 
However, as evidenced by recent events in the Great Lakes region and elsewhere in Africa, 
international support for the cause of democracy and human rights in the continent remained 
almost as limited as ever during the 1990s (Ihonvbere and Mbaku 2003, 218). 
The effectiveness of Mobutu’s strategy against the transition process was attributed to the 
fact that the Sacred Union was dominated by former cronies of the ancient region, (whose political 
careers had been nurtured under the auspices of Mobutu’s patrimonial regime) masquerading in 
the 1990s as democratic reformers. This contradiction in their former and current roles was clearly 
demonstrated by their senseless quest for power and their constant shift between resistance to, and 
collaboration with Mobutu which in turn enabled the latter to prolong his stay in power (Ihonvbere 
and Mbaku 2003, 219). 
Ultimately, the lack of cohesion and a national vision on the part of the leadership of the 
Sacred Union, the opposition’s misplaced expectations relative to Western support, and the 
dysfunctional state of Mobutu’s military machine formed the backdrop to Laurent Kabila’s ascent 
to power. On May 17, 1997, Mobutu bowed to popular demand for change and went into exile. 
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His military Generals subsequently surrendered power to Kabila and his alliance of Democratic 
Forces for the Liberation of the Congo (AFDL), an obscure and half-baked coalition of anti-
Mobutu groups, instead of the Sacred Union. This gesture reflected the general’s appreciation for 
the military and political implications of engaging Kabila’s rebel troops in what was most likely 
to be a bloody conflict in the densely populated capital city of Kinshasa and the unlikely outcome 
that that the effort would bring about the survival of a falling regime. More importantly, the action 
of the military leaders signaled the unfolding of two parallel developments related to the 
emergence of Kabila and his supporters as a major force in the politics of post-Mobutu Congo. 
The first development was the erosion of support for Mobutu within the military, which for three 
decades was the stronghold of his regime. The second one had to do with the growing irrelevance 
of the Sacred Union and a dramatic decline in popular support for mainstream opposition groups. 
Mobutu’s generals subsequently switched loyalty to Kabila to safeguard the security of their 
privileged status within its structures of power. In 1998, Kabila was faced with civil war 
orchestrated by his former supporters and mentors, Uganda and Rwanda, because of Kabila’s 
insensitivity to their security needs,  the failure of the FDL to construct a broad national base by 
opening the political space to civil society groups, NGOs, and opposition groups, and Kabila’s re-
imposition of autocratic rule on the people. After more than two years of a bloody war, the rebels 
failed to defeat Kabila and establish a transitional government to energize the process of political 
reform and national reconciliation. The failure was due to the contradictory motives and ill-
conceived strategies of the rebels. They also joined forces with Rwanda and Uganda, Kabila’s 
former allies who were resented by the Congolese people for their perceived attempts to exert 
influence on their national affairs (Ihonvbere and Mbaku 2003, 233). 
It would take the assassination of Kabila by a disgruntled bodyguard on January 16, 2001 
to diffuse the tension between the government and rebel groups. Upon his death, the political 
mantle was hastily transferred to his 29 year old son, Joseph Kabila. Kabila’s demise cleared the 
way for the Inter Congolese dialogue and subsequent efforts to implement the 1999 Lusaka Cease 
Fire Agreement which called for withdrawal of all foreign troops from Congolese territory and the 
stationing of an International Peace keeping force in its place. The measures were supposed to 
pave the way for national reconciliation and transition to multiparty democracy. Unfortunately, 
more than a decade after the collapse of the Mobutu dictatorship and the death of Kabila, the DRC 
has not made significant progress along those lines. Public aspirations for stability and social 
justice remain elusive in the absence of national consensus on how and when to establish a 
democratically elected government. The eastern half of the resource rich country remained under 
the control of rebel warlords and the younger Kabila government does not command broad 
legitimacy nationally and internationally (Ihonvbere and Mbaku 2003, 233). 
 
Ghana, Botswana and South Africa 
These three Anglophone or English speaking countries in Sub-Saharan Africa have 
generally been judged to be making significant progress towards deepening or consolidating 
democracy in their respective nations following the onset of the third wave of democratization in 
the continent in the 1990s. Ghana is lauded as the model of democratic governance that should be 
emulated by other African nations because it has successfully infused democratic ideals in its 
institutions and processes. Botswana’s successful adoption and implementation of democratic 
ideals precedes that of the other two nations given that Botswana enshrined components of liberal 
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democracy in its constitution shortly after independence in 1966. South Africa emerged from 
apartheid following the release of Nelson Mandela from jail in 1991 and his subsequent election 
as President in 1994. Following Mandela, South Africa has witnessed the peaceful transfer of 
power from one political figure to another, albeit, from the same political party, the ANC. These 
three countries are classified as nations in which democratization is progressing, albeit, with some 
challenges. 
 
Ghana 
From Independence in 1957 through the transition to democratic rule in 1992, Ghana was 
subjected to five repressive military regimes and a number of one party dictatorships. Then in the 
late 1980s, a combination of external (collapse of Soviet Union and fall the Berlin wall followed 
by calls for political freedoms to be accorded to previously oppressed populations, conditionalities 
imposed by multilateral organizations such as the World Bank and the IMF requiring political 
openness in exchange for continued resource flows to Ghana) and internal factors (economic 
decline and agitations by various social movements over the repressive machinery of the state, 
mismanagement of state resources, corruption and marginalization of ethnic groups), forced 
Ghanaian military leader Flight Lt. Jerry Rawlings to open up the political space for greater citizen 
participation. He converted the ruling Provisional National Defense Council (PNDC) into a 
political party, the National Democratic Congress (NDC) and ran and won the election for 
President in 1992. Since then Ghana has successfully managed six national elections with political 
power alternating between the NDC and NPP. So how has Ghana succeeded to deepen or 
consolidate its democratic experiment in two decades without relapse or democratic regression? 
Kwame Boafo (2008, 10) argues that Ghana has succeeded in effecting a peaceful and stable 
transition to democratic governance , against the background of many years of military rule,  by: 
establishing a fairly effective electoral management system, ensuring that there is a strong 
adherence to the rule of law, establishing an independent judiciary, sustaining a vibrant or robust 
civil society, a critical media, a viable opposition; by affirming respect for human rights and 
freedoms and by establishing excellent relations with donor nations or external partners.. In 
addition to these elements which are all critical to the establishment and sustenance of a stable 
liberal democracy, Kwame Boafo, also maintains that Ghana has succeeded to build a stable 
democratic environment by ensuring that there is a growing commitment to democratic principles 
by all stakeholders through: (1) ensuring that the memories of past experiences under military 
dictatorship were fresh in the minds of Ghanaians who were interested in seizing on changing 
political fortunes to exercise their political freedoms and civil rights, (2) enhancing civilian – 
military relations so as to forestall a return to military rule, (3) strengthening the activities of civic 
organizations and think thanks in the areas of human, political and civil rights education, (4) 
ensuring freedom of the press, (5) disbanding paramilitary organizations, and (6) Banning former 
President Rawlings from visiting military explanations. Ultimately, successful transitions to 
democratic governance in Ghana were facilitated by the commitments of reform minded leaders 
as well as their abilities to draw on previous aspects of democratic practice and experience 
(Cheeseman 2015). 
 
Challenges 
Despite Ghana’s success at consolidating and deepening its democratic experiment thus 
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far, challenges that could threaten the nation’s stability and democratic process, if they are not 
properly managed, still persist. For examples: (1) Ghana needs to reduce its extreme dependence 
on the international system at the expense of developing indigenous productive sectors that would 
minimize such dependence. No nation has been completely built through external support. An 
effort should be made to reduce dependence on external financial support while developing local 
productive sectors. A national development policy needs to be crafted that does not rely on 
impressive macro- economic indicators endorsed and appreciated by development partners while 
they mean nothing to the person on the street. (2) Ghana also needs to ensure that the problem of 
ethnicity does not undermine the electoral system and the stability of the nation. Though Ghana is 
not ethnically polarized like other nations in the continent, voting patterns along ethnic lines will 
continue to pose a danger to the nation’s democratic growth-The Ewes cannot vote mostly for the 
NDC while the Akans vote for the NPP. Urbanization and high levels of migration should help 
people grow out of their ethnocentric shells. Politicians must be aware of the harm they do on the 
campaign trail when in place of addressing issues, they mobilize instead along ethnic lines, 
oblivious of the harm it does to national stability or unity. (3) The Ghanaian democratic experiment 
is also threatened by the lingering perception of corruption in high places. Ethical leadership is 
needed if the trust and confidence of the people would be bolstered. Where leadership is perceived 
as corrupt the masses lose faith in the democratic process and may lead to frustration and social 
expression. (4) Ghana’s stability also risks being undermined if attempts are not made to improve 
the ranks of the poor and unemployed. Sustained poverty may undermine the trust people have in 
the government and the legitimacy they grant to the democratic system of government in general 
and the ruling class in particular. The economic status of citizens is almost as important as their 
civil and political liberties and holds the key to the growth of democracy and sustained stability. 
There is always a thresh hold, a defining moment, a point where the convergence of desperation 
and frustration borne out of severe economic deprivation would lead to political implosion and 
this would undermine any stable polity. 
 
Botswana 
Widely acclaimed as Africa’s senior or longest surviving democracy, Botswana is the one 
country in Sub-Saharan Africa that has been experimenting with democratic ideals since 
independence in 1966. Abundant research from Botswana scholars and observers of the political 
scene in that nation, all argue that Botswana has done what no other country in the continent has 
succeeded to accomplish: blend elements of Tswana culture with core aspects of modern 
democracy to engineer a unique but nonetheless stable parliamentary form of democracy: How 
has Botswana succeeded to sustain the democratic experiment. David Sebudubudu and Bertha 
Osei-Hwedie (2006, 35), posit that Botswana’s multiparty democracy has been portrayed by 
various scholars as a shining example of a living democracy primarily because of relatively free 
and fair elections, political tolerance, multiparty competition, the rule of law that includes a legal 
system that protects the rights and freedoms of citizens, democratic rules and procedures, free 
public and private press and a strong civil society. Within the context of a liberal democratic polity 
in Botswana as portrayed by the definition above, the authors, examine the role of parliament, 
political parties, bureaucracy, civil society, the media and judiciary, in an effort to determine 
whether these institutions function effectively enough to sustain Botswana’s 
parliamentary/parliamentary democracy.  
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Challenges 
Botswana has succeeded in establishing a mixture of a parliamentary/presidential 
democratic system in which the president occupies a dominant power position. In terms of the state 
of democratic governance in Botswana, the Botswana Democratic Party’s good management of 
the economy is acclaimed within the country and beyond because of high growth rates and public 
expenditure on social services like water and health clinics throughout the country. Moreover, the 
low levels of corruption, by African standards, have earned Botswana the label of democratic 
governance. Holm maintains that the success of the government’s development plan and the 
positive impact of social and welfare programs make the BDP a formidable electoral challenge. 
The fact that the opposition benefits from the policies of the ruling BDP makes it difficult for the 
opposition to mount credible criticisms of public policies. It is pertinent to note here that despite 
impressive growth rates and the availability of social services a large number of people remain 
poor and income equality remains high. Also, unemployment has risen from 21% of the force in 
2001 to 24% in 2003, which is too high for a well to do nation, thus reflecting problems with the 
diversification of the economy. 
Botswana is the longest, stable parliamentary democracy in Sub-Saharan Africa. However, 
its mixed record of democratic governance suggests that there are limitations and room for 
improvement due to reasons such as: (a) Weak parliamentary oversight and parliamentary 
opposition seriously challenges the democratic process. (b) Weak civil society and an inefficient 
media have left more room for the government to maneuver without much oversight of the 
executive, fortunately the executive has managed to same extent to promote democratic 
governance with respect to the rule of law, tolerance of associations and political parties and 
promotion of economic growth and the provision of social services. (c) The lack of serious 
opposition challenge to the ruling party and predominance of the BDP suggest a not so efficient 
multiparty democracy. (d) A weak civil society and media also indicate some elements of 
democratic governance are still lacking. (e) This leaves only the judiciary as the last bastion of 
protection of civil rights and freedoms of citizens and check government arbitrariness and 
corruption. In terms of the above mentioned challenges, Botswana’s parliamentary democratic 
system appears to be overly rated when compared to emergent multiparty systems in the Southern 
African region (Sebudubudu and Osei-Hwedie 2006, 50). 
 
South Africa 
South Africa emerged from decades of apartheid rule by the election in 1994 of a 
government led by the African National Congress, headed by President Nelson Mandela. This 
momentous event marked an important milestone not only for South Africa but for Africa 
generally. The transition from apartheid rule to democracy signaled the end of formal colonial or 
settler rule in South Africa. On one level, the new South African Democracy appears robust and 
substantive. While there has been no alternation or turn over in office at the national level, free 
and fair legislative elections have been held regularly with universal franchise and multiparty 
competition and there is an independent judiciary, a critical press and a rigorous civil society. On 
the other level, there are at least two grounds for questioning the quality of the new Democracy. 
First the strength of the ANC undermines the constitutional separation of powers and the 
accountability of the executive to the electorate. Secondly, the ANC is widely accused of having 
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betrayed the working class and the poor by adopting new liberal policies that serve the interest of 
capital and therefore represent continuity from the apartheid era While there is some merit in each 
critique the formal procedures of representative democracy are not inconsequent and more 
importantly, a arrange of classes and interest groups, besides capita, wield power, albeit, in 
different ways (Mustapha and Whitfield 2009, 134). 
The very economic growth and change that seemed to sustain apartheid also served to 
undermine it. The demand for semi- skilled and skilled labor drove the rapid expansion of public 
education albeit of racially unequal quality. Despite restriction on Urbanization, the settled African 
population grew steadily. The result was that by 1980 there was an organized African working 
class and an aspirant middle class both of which resented the remaining and severe restrictions on 
their standard of living and opportunities for upward mobility as well as the denial of political 
rights (Mustapha and Whitfield 2009, 134-135). At the same time rapidly growing numbers of 
unemployed and landless poor provided a ready constituency for direct action. Militant trade 
unions combined with resistance in the townships to push the apartheid state to limited concessions 
and later negotiations. The ban on the ANC was lifted and Nelson Mandela was released in 1990. 
Formal negotiations led to an agreement over an interim constitution and transitional power 
sharing and then to the elections of 1994.  
 
The Institutional foundations of South African Democracy 
The legislature elected in 1994 also served as a constitutional assembly to complete the 
process of drafting a new constitution. In 1996, it passed a liberal constitution that rejected a 
consociation power sharing arrangement but set real constraints on executive power. In contrast to 
the apartheid era, it is the constitution and not the parliament that is sovereign because: (a) The 
constitution provides for a separation of powers between the different branches of government 
including the executive, judiciary and legislature and a set of independent statutory bodies such as 
the Auditor General and the Electoral Commission. The reserve Bank is independent but by act of 
Parliament, is not under the constitution. (b) The constitution also provides for a separation of 
powers between tiers or levels of government: national, provincial and local government. (c) The 
third constraint on executive power stems from the inclusions of a Bill of Rights that stipulates not 
only civil and political freedoms but also socio-economic rights (Mustapha and Whitfield 2009, 
135). While political power rests with the ANC, economic power in the neoliberal tradition is 
controlled by international and domestic capital. Foreign and domestic business elites wield 
influence in South Africa mostly behind closed doors and on the golf courses and business men 
and international agencies such as the World Bank and IMF exerted influence in the early 1990s 
to ensure political stability within the ANC. The ANC has firmly established itself as the party of 
black business, the black middle class and professionals and will place the needs of these groups 
before those of the slum dwellers, unemployed, rural constituents and the youth. Many members 
of the new super-rich black elite are ANC members (Mustapha and Whitfield 2009, 142-143). 
 South Africa has a very strong trade union movement that is designed to provide improved 
wages and employment conditions to workers. In 2000, there were 460 registered trade unions 
with a membership of 3.5 million and just over half of these belonged to one or the other of the 19 
unions affiliated with the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU). The power of the 
trade unions lies not in their use of industrial protests but in the threat of such action, their 
entrenched position in union friendly labor institutions and their influence within the ANC. There 
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has been little strike action in post- apartheid South Africa because there has been little need for 
it. The high point of union power was in the 1990s when COSATU secured desired reforms of 
labor legislation. Institutions and policies designed in the 1920s to protect the interest of skilled 
white workers were extended and strengthened in the 1990s to protect the interests of the skilled 
black workers who comprised the backbone of COSATU. The 1995 Labor Relations Act provided 
for centralized bargaining between employers and unions, procedures for the arbitration and 
settlement of disputes and strong restrictions on dismissal by employers (Mustapha and Whitfield 
2009, 144). 
 
Challenges Impacting South African Democracy  
While South Africa’s democratic transition has registered impressive gains as discussed 
above, it has also been plagued by several challenges. Ironically, many of the same checks and 
balances established by the constitution have proved to be ineffective in the face of a generally 
centralized governing party with overwhelming electoral support.  For example, the constitution 
provides for a parliamentary system with a parliament that is elected by the citizenry (the National 
Assembly by direct election, the national council of provinces by the provincial legislatures), and 
a President who is elected by and is accountable to Parliament. However, local, national and 
provincial legislatures are elected separately and each level of government enjoys considerable 
autonomy from the others. There is even in independent Financial and Fiscal Commission to guide 
the division of government revenues-vertically between the different tiers and horizontally 
between the different provinces and municipalities. In practice, the system is a hybrid presidential-
parliamentary system and more unitary than federal. The national executive has come to 
predominate and the national legislature and sub- national tiers of government have been reduced 
to minor roles (Mustapha and Whitfield 2009, 135). 
The legislature has proved to be the weakest institution of state. It has done little more than 
pass legislation prepared by the executive and has rarely even tried to hold the executive to 
account. Parliamentary portfolio committees play only passive roles. This is due largely to the 
heavy hand of the ANC, which redeployed members of Parliament and was quick to suppress 
independent action. For example, when the Finance Committee dared to examine the government’s 
policy of inflation targeting in 2000, the entire ANC membership of the committee was summoned 
to a personal dressing down by the President (Mustapha and Whitfield 2009, 136). Provincial 
governments have also failed to use the power accorded to them by the constitution thus leaving 
the national government in control of power in terms of policymaking and the allocation of 
resources. The passivity of the South African legislature is due in large part to the combination of 
the electoral system and the dominance of one party. Given the passivity of the legislature and 
provincial governments and the inclusion of rights in the constitution, it is not surprising that the 
Constitutional Court has become a prospective player in policy making. At the same time that 
power has been concentrated in the executive branch it has been centralized in the executive 
himself especially when Mbeki took over as South African President. The reason for the 
concentration of power in the executive, especially the Presidency, may be attributed to the fact 
that there has been a centralization of power within the ANC and Mbeki’s intolerance of opposition 
inside and outside the party, suggested that his personality was part of the problem. Mbeki was 
described as a man with a devotion to long term strategy and an egocentric view of his own place 
in history. His passion for centralized power was rooted in a life time spent in exile in an ANC that 
23
Ngwafu: U.S. Support for Democracy in Africa: Discrepant Orientations of
Published by Digital Scholarship @ Texas Southern University,
46 
 
was wedded to a vanguard role. A vanguard conception of armed struggle easily led to a vanguard 
conception of political and economic management (Mustapha and Whitfield 2009, 138). 
The South African government was constituted as a government of national unity in 1994 
and since then the ANC has held dominant sway over the political process leaving only a handful 
of cabinet positions to other parties. The ANC has secured about two thirds of the total vote in 
each election, although the relative strength of opposition parties has shifted considerably. The 
ANC won 7 of the 9 provinces in the 1994 elections, gained partial of an 8th in the 1999 elections 
and won control of the 9th in 2002 when it lured legislators from other parties to defect to the ANC. 
The ANC retained control of all 9 provinces after the 2004 elections. The continued dominance of 
the ANC does not mean that there have been no changes in the party political landscape. On the 
contrary there have been dramatic changes among opposition parties such as the National Party 
(NP) or the party of apartheid reborn as the New National Party (NNP) the Democratic Alliance 
(DA), have remained active in opposition politics. In 2005 the NNP disbanded and most of its 
members were absorbed into the ANC).  Overall South Africa is a dominant democracy in which 
the governing party is largely immune from effective challenge hence there is little or no 
uncertainty about election results and the electoral system provides for only weak accountability 
(Mustapha and Whitfield 2009, 138-140). 
 
The State of South African Democracy 
The post -apartheid South Africa has witnessed the emergence of various movements 
shaped by different groups none of which has remained dominant. The power of different groups 
has changed over time. The early 2000s saw the growing power of black business men and women 
in the ANC and the decline in trade union influence. Black empowerment moved to the center of 
state policy. Corruption, especially in the award of state contracts in the name of Black Economic 
Empowerment or BEE was pervasive. Much of the leadership of the ANC is preoccupied with 
sharing in the opportunities for rapid financial enrichment. Critics wonder whether the enthusiasm 
of the political elite for sharing in these opportunities may not have led them to enact the policies 
that create these same opportunities (Mustapha and Whitfield 2009, 149) Trade Unions retain 
power in specific forms. In terms of policy making their power lies in inhibiting undesirable 
changes to the status quo. Trade Unions have mobilized massively against labor market policy 
reform and against reforms of the public sector especially in education. Their mobilization is 
within the ANC alliance rather than in the street or workplace.  Some social groups enjoy little 
power outside the ANC. For example, the rural and urban poor lack organizational muscle and the 
electoral systems effectively deny them the power to hold elected representatives to account. The 
emergence of new social movements may be seen as demands by the poor and others who have 
been denied a place at the table. Despite these challenges, South Africa is recognized as a vibrant 
or dynamic democratic state which is making credible attempts to refine its democratic processes 
so as to embrace more transparent democratic forms of governance.  
 
A Policy Framework for American Support for Democratic Transitions in Africa 
The preceding discussion of discrepant orientations towards democratic practices by 
Anglophone and Francophone sub-Saharan African countries requires that the United States re-
examine its support for democratic transitions in Africa so as to ensure that such support is 
designed to enable affected African states to undertake credible transitions to more open and 
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accountable forms of governance, shaped by African values, as opposed to western neo-liberal 
principles. To that end, a policy framework for American support for democratic transitions in 
sub- Saharan Africa should include assisting in the removal of dictators, freezing their bank 
accounts, and restricting them from traveling to US by imposing VISA restrictions on them, 
reducing military assistance to nations deemed to have reneged or regressed from embracing 
democratic values, strengthening civic or civil society organizations and empowering women, 
improving economic conditions in Africa by imposing conditionalities on them, for future 
allocation of resources, if economic institutions are ineffective because of a lack of good 
governance and internal legitimacy, forgiving the debt of poor African countries, providing 
resources to African scholars to engage in research on best practices for democratization, 
organizing workshops and seminars across the continent where the public can engage in civic 
education about democracy, assisting with Institutional Change by supporting the establishment, 
development or strengthening of critical state institutions-such as constitutions, the media, civil 
service, electoral systems, the judiciary, encouraging inter- African exchange of information on 
Democratization and generally inter-African cooperation, directing human development to such 
areas as health, education, food security and empowerment of women and mobilizing the 
international community to reduce senseless bloodshed  and human rights abuses by imposing 
arms embargoes on governments and political groups that thrive on brutalization of opponents 
and fail to embrace more accountable forms of democratic governance. The issue of respect for 
the human rights of Africans by African leaders and societies may be better understood and 
practiced if a new paradigm is devised that clearly addresses different perspectives about 
individual and collective rights in the continent (Cohen, Hyden and Nagan 1993). 
 
 
Concluding Remarks 
This paper has attempted to re-examine American support for democratic transitions in 
sub-Saharan Africa amid discrepant orientations towards democratic practices, good governance 
and human rights by Anglophone and francophone African nations. A preponderance of the 
literature on transitions to more open and accountable forms of government in Africa since the 
1990s speaks about the impressive efforts that Anglophone nations of Africa have made towards 
transitioning from previously autocratic political systems to more transparent and accountable 
forms of governance. By the same token, there is credible evidence from the same scholarly 
sources that articulate the unwillingness or inability of francophone sub-Saharan African nations 
to embrace these new forms of governance apparently because the status quo serves the interests 
of the political leaders of these countries and their external mentor-France. The various economic, 
cultural and security arrangements that France established with its former colonies in Africa in the 
1960s have enabled the French to maintain unprecedented influence in the domestic and external 
affairs of nations such as Cameroon, Ivory Coast and the Democratic Republic of Congo, in over 
fifty years after independence. Sustained by institutions such as La Francophonie and France-
Afrique, French leaders since De Gaulle have supported African leaders, even if those leaders were 
engaged in practices that stymied efforts at democratic transitions and transparent governance, as 
long as French strategic interests (political, economic and cultural) were advanced (Martin 1997). 
By contrast, the British have not sought to exert undue influence in the internal affairs of its former 
colonies in Africa and have largely left leaders and citizens of those nation to embrace the kinds 
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of democratic transitions that are compatible with their values and historical experiences.  It is 
against this background that this paper proposes a thorough re-examination of American support 
for democratic transitions in Africa in large part because it was American leadership (with the 
support of its western allies) that stimulated, energized and supported the movements for 
transitions across Africa in the early 1990s (Kpundeh 1992). Given that it has been over two 
decades since these historic events occurred in Africa, this paper proposes that America re-
examines its support for democracy in Africa by crafting a policy framework that would truly 
reward those African nations that have clearly demonstrated measurable changes towards more 
accountable forms of government, consistent with African values of democracy, and withdraw or 
deny support to those that continue to embrace the status quo. 
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